While it is commonly believed that derivative instruments are a recent invention, we document the existence of forward contracts for the sale of wool in medieval England around 700 years ago. The contracts were generally entered into by English monasteries, who frequently sold their wool for up to twenty years in advance to mostly foreign and particularly Italian merchants. Employing a unique source of data collected by hand from the historical records, we determine the interest rates implied in these transactions and we also examine the efficiency of the forward and spot markets. The calculated interest rates average around 20%, in accordance with available information concerning the interest rates used in other types of transactions at that time. Perhaps surprisingly, we also find little evidence of informational inefficiencies in these markets.
Introduction
It is widely believed that derivative instruments such as forward contracts and options are recent inventions despite evidence to the contrary. The first official exchange for trading contracts for forward delivery, the Royal Exchange (which later became the London Commodity Exchange), was formed in 1570 as a place where metal traders could come together. A formal futures exchange occurred in the late seventeenth century in the Japanese rice markets. Whilst the US has now become the world's largest centre for derivatives trading, the first forward contract in the US (on corn) was not written until 1851 following the formation of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848 1 . Kairys and Valerio (1997) discuss a highly developed options market that existed for a brief period in New York between 1873 and 1875.
However an examination of the appropriate historical documents demonstrates the existence of quite sophisticated financial instruments much earlier -for example, in England in the Middle Ages. Within the historical literature, there is an ongoing revisionism regarding the sophistication of medieval financial transactions. Recent research has included that by Munro (1991a; 1991b) and Kowaleski (1995) on transaction costs, by Masschaele (1997) on business partnerships and by Spufford (2002) on banking.
Many of the financial instruments employed were motivated by the illegality of interest payments on loans (usury) at that time, creating a need for relatively complex transactions that paid an implicit interest.
For example, Knoll (2004) suggests that landowners would sometimes transfer the legal title of their property to a "financier" in exchange for cash. The financier would earn a profit by collecting any rents or profits that accrued to the holder of the land, and the original landowner had the right to reclaim the land at the original price on a pre-specified date. Knoll shows that such an arrangement effectively uses an options-based approach and the put-call parity relation to artificially create the same contingent payoffs as a loan secured on property. Both puts and calls were written on tulip bulbs in Amsterdam in the 1600's.
Not only options, but also instruments akin to forward contracts were in widespread use in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. For instance, Italian merchant societies, most notably the Bardi and contracts in the late thirteenth century between Cistercian monasteries in England and Italian merchant bankers. That some of these bankers were subsequently bankrupted has been widely documented and some of the blame has been controversially levelled at Edward III. 5 The peak in export trade in wool was during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries with perhaps 40-45,000 sacks exported each year, gradually declining to around 33,000 sacks in 1355 and only 9,706 sacks in 1476. 6 The crown's decision to tax the export of wool encouraged (deliberately or not) the development of a domestic cloth industry and thus a move to the export of cloth. This domestic cloth industry was further strengthened by the immigration of Flemish cloth weavers, who perhaps kickstarted the growth of the textile industry in England. The wool export market may have declined, but in its place a textile industry was born. It could indeed be claimed that wool was at the forefront of the establishment of England as a European political and economic power.
Sources of Data, Contract Details and Wool Pricing
The unique data employed in this study are the details of recorded contracts between sheep farmers and, generally, foreign merchants seeking wool to export for textile manufacture. Information from over 220 contracts has been collected from The National Archives for the period 1200 -1330, although the vast majority was enrolled between 1270 and 1310. Simple registrations of debt and more complex arrangements are found in the Memoranda Rolls of the Exchequer, longer, more detailed contracts in the Close Rolls of the Chancery, while the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer detail disputes over, and attempted resolution of, instances of default. Most contracts were written in medieval Latin, though a handful survive in medieval French. A sample translated contract follows:
E159/60, rot. 18 12 May 1287
Recognisance of the abbot of Meaux.
He came before the exchequer court and recognised for himself, his convent and his successors that he was bound to Ricardo and Reynerio Guidicionis, Henrico de Podio and Thomasino Guidicionis, and their fellow merchants of Lucca, in eleven sacks of the better wool of his house, pressed and packed into round bales and weighed according to the ancient custom of the house, to be delivered to the merchants in the quindene of the Nativity of St
John the Baptist [8 July] 1289 in Hull, packed into the sarplers of the abbot and convent. For which wool the abbot acknowledged he had received the full price in advance, which is to say 15 marks per sack. And if the abbot cannot deliver the said wool to the merchants at the specified term, he agrees for himself, his convent and for his successors as abbot that the exchequer might levy the wool or its value from the lands, tenements, goods and chattels of the house.
The contracts are highly detailed 7 and give information on the purchaser and seller, the quality and amount of wool to be delivered, the due dates for delivery, and the amount of money per sack to be paid, together with information on any advance and miscellaneous payments. Contracts could remain in force from just a few months to as long as twenty years. In total, they record arrangements for the delivery of around 5500 sacks of wool between both a small number of individual, lay producers and all of the major monastic orders (though the Cistercians predominate, contracting for exactly half of the total wool sold) and wool merchants from England, France, Flanders, Germany, Spain, and, most especially, the Italian city states of Florence, Genoa, Lucca, Piacenza, and Pistoia. The contracts were individually tailored by the counterparties since no formalised secondary market existed, and thus these are forward agreements of sorts rather than futures contracts.
3.1 Why were these agreements formed and what was the nature of them?
It is of interest to examine t he motivations that each counterparty would have had to enter into the agreement. For the monasteries, their gains from the contract could be twofold. First, they would have known in advance how much money they would obtain for their wool for several years into the future, which would have enabled them to plan financially. Second, and almost certainly more importantly, they obtained large up front payments that could be put to immediate use for building works and the dual burden of royal and papal tax payments. Even though they were theoretically very wealthy in terms of their assets, many monasteries found themselves in dire financial straits, with large debts, and they were therefore in desperate need of cash.
All merchants were keen to ensure a continual supply of high quality wool to fuel cloth production in the rapidly expanding urban, industrial centres of Flanders and northern Italy. Italian societies, in particular, sought out, and had the capacity to pay very high prices for, the highest quality wools, committing their financial resources to producers over prolonged periods to secure them. Just two societies, the Riccardi of Lucca and the Frescobaldi of Florence, for instance, took over 50% of the total contracted wool, investing around £20000. 8 In 1294, moreover, Italian merchants were buying from 49 out of the 74
Cistercian monasteries, which produced the best grade wool.
7 It should be stated at the outset that any study of medieval source data from a modern finance perspective is fraught with difficulty. The techniques that are in common usage today for the pricing of financial assets can typically rely on large quantities of readily accessible data of high quality. However, the records that were kept in the Middle Ages were far from complete, and there was no international standard in terms of wool quality, quantity or even exchange rates, all of which combine to make comparisons across different transactions difficult. For example, Lloyd (1973, p.2) , argues that, "a stone … might weigh almost anything from 6 to 28 pounds". Therefore, the calculations performed below will necessarily require a number of assumptions that would be unnecessary for research using modern data. 8 And this represented only a fraction of their total outlay in trading operations in England.
Through the contracts, we would anticipate that the merchants should typically receive the wool at a significant discount compared to the prices prevailing at that time 9 . Ignoring any time value of money, the average value per sack of wool specified in the contracts is some 20% lower than the monks would have received if they sold their wool at the prevailing price at the time that the contract was signed. Of course, this average figure masks enormous variations (a standard deviation of 22%) in the differences across contracts. An extreme example is where William, Abbot of Flaxley (Gloucs.), contracted on 21
November 1281 10 to sell 8 sacks of wool (6 of good wool, 1 of middle wool and 1 of locks) for delivery on 9 July 1291 to Thomas de Basinges, citizen of London. The prevailing price for good wool at that time was 4,178d, but the abbot received only 1,120d, representing a 73% discount, although the contract suggests that there had been postponement of an earlier delivery. As one would expect, previous default seems to reduce the amount that an abbot could expect to receive for his wool by selling it in advance.
Examining only those contracts where there is renegotiation following default, the typical discount relative to the market price rises to 27%.
Examining the size of these discounts is simply another way of looking at the large interest payments that the merchants received on their loans to the monasteries. Although it is impossible to separate the impact of the quality of wool from the implicit loan interest (aside from information on the broad quality categorisations described below), given the vast differences between the prevailing market prices and the prices that the abbots received by selling in advance, it cannot be said that the merchants were paying over the odds for their wool.
On the other hand, there were instances of the monks receiving larger payments per sack than the prevailing prices, although these were rather rare and the differences were usually very small. The most extreme example is when Reyner of the Coxford priory (Norfolk) contracted on 17 October 1287 11 to sell eight sacks of wool to the Riccardi for delivery on 24 June 1288 at a price of 1,760 d per sack when the prevailing price was 1,323d, a premium of 33%.
Another interesting feature of the majority of contracts is that, no matter what their duration, the payments per sack for a given grade of wool remained fixed. For example, the agreement enrolled on 29
September 1298 between Abbot Adam of Combermere (Cheshire) and the Frescobaldi stipulated that four sacks of good wool would be delivered annually on 8 July for twenty years for a fixed price of £9.6s.8d per sack 12 . One possible explanation for the fact that the prices per sack specified in the contract do not increase over the lifetime of the contract is that these amounts per sack were purely 9 We would also expect that the prices would be lower than if they had waited and bought it on a year-by-year basis a situation akin to normal backwardation of the forward prices. 10 The National Archives, Kew [hereafter TNA] E 159/55, rot. 6. 11 TNA E 159/61, rot. 12. 12 Note that there is no conflict with the notion of normal backwardation here since there was no secondary market for these forward contracts and therefore no expectation that the forward price will move towards the spot price as maturity approaches.
notional figures "for the records". That is, the merchant had said, "I will pay you the sum of £500 now, and I want to receive five sacks of good wool per year for the next ten years". It would not matter whether the contract stipulated that the sacks were all worth £10, or whether they were worth £8 per sack for the first five years and £12 thereafter. Thus fixing the amounts specified per sack as fixed through time was done purely for mathematical simplicity.
An alternative explanation is that wool prices had no predictable patterns or trends, and the counterparties were aware of this and set the contract details accordingly. The stability of the prices within the contracts stands in stark contrast to the highly volatile series of actual wool prices. Figure 1 plots the mean annual prices of wool, in shillings per stone of 14 pounds, from Lloyd (1973, there was indeed no underlying upward trend in prices. Therefore it was sensible, when viewed ex post, for both parties to assume that prices would not rise over the contract period. Examining the other main features of the wool price series, there were recoinages in 1274 and 1299. A fall in wool prices resulted from the latter but not the former, with prices in 1300-1305 lower than they had been in the recent past.
An outbreak of scab occurred in 1268, and this did not abate until after 1283. Lloyd alleges that this led many abbeys to withdraw permanently from sheep farming.
Some summary statistics for the mean annual wool prices from Lloyd for the period 1268 -1328 (61 observations) are presented in Table 1 . As can be seen from the table, the average wool price was £4.62, with a standard deviation of £0.76. The series is positively skewed and is slightly leptokurtic. While the series is persistent, with first and second order autocorrelation coefficients of around 0.75, the raw price series is just stationary at the conventional significance level according to a Dickey-Fuller test.
Methodology

Calculating the Interest Rate for the Wool Transactions
A first issue is the question as to whether the advance wool contracts are best analysed as forwards or loans. Eldridge and Maltby (1992) have investigated one particular thirteenth century contract between
Fountains Abbey and a group of Florentine merchants for the advance sale of wool, arguing that this is equivalent to a modern forward contract. As they point out, these agreements certainly have many of the characteristics of forward contracts as the term would be understood by financial market practitionersthey are an agreement for the purchase/sale of a particular quantity of wool of specific quality grade. The dates and places where the wool will be delivered, and the payment schedule are also specified meticulously in the contracts. 13 Note that both Lloyd and Munro use decimals to denote prices (e.g. 10s 6d would be written 10.5s). 14 Unless otherwise stated, henceforth all wool prices quoted are per sack.
However, most historians would argue that such transactions were in fact loans in disguise, motivated by the illegality of usury (interest) at that time. The key point appears to be that no money would change hands on the contract signing date in the case of a forward contract, but the monasteries often received large up-front payments. Equally, these agreements are not pure loans since the "repayment" was in wool rather than cash. Thus we conjecture that the transactions have both loan and forward contract features, and given the kind of data available, it appears impossible to separate the two parts. Thus we are able to calculate a rate of interest implied in the transaction, which will be a composite rate made up of both loan interest and the cost of carry.
The core formulae for valuing futures on commodities are the cost of carry relations, which stipulate that the fair price to pay today for delivery of the commodity in the future is equal to the spot price adjusted for the cost of storage of the commodity plus the cost of funding it. In theory, for the case of wool forwards, there is also a "convenience yield" to consider, since physical ownership of the wool would have been valuable in case of wool shortages during the lifetime of the contract. If shortages are deemed likely, the convenience yield will be high, although if merchants have large inventories, this yield will be small. Thus the relationship between spot and forward prices for wool may be expressed as
where F0 is the fair forward price. S0 is the current spot price, r is the discount rate, u is the cost of storage as a constant proportion of the spot price and paid continuously, y is the convenience yield, and T is the time to maturity of the contract.
Wool in the thirteenth century had very poor keeping qualities and therefore a very short shelf life. Lloyd (1973, p3) notes that "when a clip had to be held over from one year to the next it was often sold at a lower price than fetched by new wool." Additionally, while the cost of storage would probably not have been significant as many abbeys had such facilities, in the cases that we are interested in there would have been no incentive to hold the wool back. Even if the current market price is below that which had been expected or that likely to prevail in the future, the monasteries had already agreed the prices that will be received through the contracts. Given the monasteries' precarious financial positions, it would have made no sense for them to store wool when it could have been used to generate cash immediately.
Therefore, while it would not be possible for us to separate out the storage cost, and the convenience yield parts of the interest rate (u and y), we would argue that u would be small and y would be negligible.
As stated above, it is the case that for the vast majority of contracts, F0 is substantially below S0, and therefore employing equation (1) to back out the implied interest rate (r+u-y) will yield a negative rate. Trussel with the Riccardi of Lucca for the supply of two sacks of good wool per year at the feast of the Nativity of St John the Baptist (24 June) for three years starting in 1289. The merchants paid the full eleven marks per sack in advance upon signing the contract. The details of the contract are given in Table 2 , and this information is used to calculate the implied rate of interest.
The present value calculation would be 2 1291 1 1290 1289
where adv is the advance payment received, i.e. the full payment of 11 marks (1760d) per sack × 6 sacks, t1 is the time from enrolment (contract signing) to due delivery for the first batch. This equation would then be solved for r. Note that the prices, P1289…P1291 to be employed in the present value calculation would not be the prices specified in the contract, since using these would give a calculated interest rate of zero. Given the illegality of usury at the time, the transaction would have shown an implicit rather than explicit return for the merchants on lending the money. Instead, following Eldridge and Maltby, we employ the spot prices that actually prevailed on those dates.
Determining the "Spot" Price of Wool
In order to be able to calculate the implied interest rate underlying these transactions, it is necessary to know the prevailing "spot" price, or the price that would have been paid on a particular date for immediate delivery of wool. Unfortunately, this information is considerably harder to obtain than that for advance delivery because most straightforward swaps of cash for wool would not have been recorded. The classic source of spot prices is Lloyd (1973) , who provides information on wool prices by year and by region. But a casual examination of his Table 1 suggests significantly lower valuations than those in the forward contracts we consider. Munro (1978) , indeed, has argued that Lloyd's prices for 1294 are only 57% of the mean English abbey wool price in the Exchequer Schedule of that year. This schedule, arising from the seizure of the goods of foreign merchants by Edward I, details the merchant inventories of wool confiscated by the king and also provides the spot prices for monastic wool prevalent in England and Wales in that year. 16 Munro argues that Lloyd's prices are biased for that year since they are based on only five districts that produced relatively low quality wool.
15 TNA E 159/62, rot. 14. 16 TNA E 101/126/7 However, whilst Lloyd's prices for 1294 are lower than those for previous years, none of them are close to those contained in the forward contracts. The prices contained in Munro, drawn from the Exchequer Schedule, look more plausible, but also have drawbacks. Most importantly, the data are only available for this single year, and not for the range of years that we wish to consider. The other prices presented in Munro, Table 1 are obtained from a further two sources: the Douai Schedule of prevailing English wool prices on the continent (c. 1270) and the Pegolotti Schedule, a ready reckoner of monastic wool production and prices around the turn of the fourteenth century compiled by a Florentine merchant with experience of English market conditions. 17 The average difference between the Douai and Pegolotti schedules is around 8%, while the Exchequer Schedule averages about 13% less for English wool. These differences are attributable to the costs of transportation, taxes and so on since the Douai and Pegolotti Schedules refer to prices in Flanders for variable dates. We will therefore adopt the Exchequer Schedule as our point of reference, representing the spot wool price in 1294.
We then make an adjustment to these prices based on the difference between the average price for good quality wool that prevailed in 1294 according to Lloyd (£3.86 ) and Lloyd's price for good quality wool in the year that the contract was enrolled and in that region. To give an illustration, suppose that the Exchequer schedule price for wool from a particular abbey is 1200d and the contract is enrolled in 1275.
The mean wool price from Lloyd for that year in that region is £4.15, and so the adjusted price that we use as a proxy for the price that would have prevailed for immediate delivery of good wool in 1275 is 1,200d × £4.15 / £3.86 = 1,290d 18 .
We are thus implicitly assuming that while Lloyd's average prices are too low, the proportional variations in prices between regions and across years are accurate. We will also assume that prices did not vary within a year. According to Lloyd (1973, p5) , this assumption held in reality since both the supply of and the demand for wool were known by the time that the sheep were to be sheared.
A number of contracts were necessarily excluded from this part of the statistical analysis. A contract had to be removed from the sample if it did not specify the wool quality, if the abbey was not listed in the Exchequer Schedule and there was no nearby comparator abbey, if there were ambiguities in the contract (for example, if a contract states that 12 sacks are to be delivered but the sum of the sacks of good wool, middle wool and locks is 14 sacks), if a price per sack is not quoted, or if no delivery date is specified in the contract, or if there is no advance payment. The statistical analysis focuses mainly on good wool since it is this grade that is discussed in the Exchequer schedule. However, the spot prices for lower grades of wool are scaled down for inclusion in the calculation -this is discussed in greater detail below.
We also removed from the analysis any contracts with a lifetime of less than 9 months, to exclude any contracts covering wool from the same season. Finally, for the calculation of interest rates (but not for the other statistical analysis), we only examine contracts where the advance payment constituted the entire amount to be remitted by the merchants to the abbots. Sometimes, the contracts make vague references to complex miscellaneous payments. This restriction was imposed to avoid the need to make assumptions about when the additional payments from the merchants would be made during the lifetime of the contract, unless the contract also specified this, in which case it was included in the analysis.
Wool Quality and Its Effect on Price
An examination of the contracts clearly shows that the merchants were sensibly willing to pay more for wool of higher quality. Wool quality varied substantially by region according to the breed of sheep and the quality of the land for grazing. In the contracts that we have investigated, medieval wool was classified into four broad categories: good wool (highest quality, fine wool), middle wool, locks, and second locks (locks are the poor quality, coarser, loose wool). The finest textured, highest valued wool tended to emanate from Lincolnshire, the Welsh Marches and Yorkshire, while the Downlands of Kent, Surrey and Sussex produced cheaper, coarser material. A casual examination of the contracts that we have found suggests that middle-grade wool is typically worth about two thirds that of good wool, with locks worth around half that of good wool. More precisely, averaging over all of the relevant contracts in our sample, middle-grade wool forward prices specified in the contracts are 68.2% of good wool prices.
Similarly, locks are worth 50.3% of good wool prices. Finally, collecta wool (good wool that an abbey would collect in its stores from other local non-monastic producers to be sold together) is worth 82.6% of non-collecta good wool. Since spot price data are only available for good quality wool, we use these percentages to convert the good wool spot prices in the present value calculations to obtain appropriate spot prices for lower grades of wool.
There is significant evidence in these contracts that religious orders obtained more for their wool than non-monastic sellers. The average discount of the contract price per sack from the prevailing market price is 18% for religious orders but 25% for others. It also appears that some religious orders were systematically able to obtain more for their wool than others. It is commonly thought that Cistercian wool was particularly highly valued because it was not only of good quality, but it was also subjected to a highly skilled preparation before delivery. Indeed, in sixty contracts p redominantly, though not exclusively, made with Cistercian monks, merchants demanded thorough washing, drying, sorting, weighing and specialized packaging of the purchased wool, time-consuming and costly processes in which Cistercian abbeys excelled. The Exchequer Schedule 19 explicitly states the expenses of the wool dresser, which usually amounted to around 2%-4% of the total value of the wool.
19 E101/126/7, mm.14, 17
Risks to the Counterparties
In the context of futures contracts, where there would be no counterparty risk, the appropriate discount rate would be the risk-free rate, but in the present context it is likely that not only did such risks exist, but there could also have been differential levels of risk between the merchants and the abbots. The lack of storability of medieval wool beyond a few months implies that it would not have been possible to hedge a long dated forward position. Therefore, both the suppliers of wool and the purchasing merchants would have faced risks when entering into a contractual agreement for the exchange of wool for cash, and these risks are likely to have been reflected in the prices paid or received for the wool.
On the abbots' side, the only real risk was that they had contracted to supply something that they later found themselves unable to deliver. Lloyd (1973) argues "Despite the fact that the contracts provided a guaranteed outlet for the wool and a fixed price, they were of dubious advantage to the grower. If his flocks were hit by disease then the grower would have to buy wool to fulfil his quotas, and if disease was general, he might have to pay more for the wool than the price at which he had contracted to sell it." (p.8)
Since the abbots could have no idea whether their flock would be diseased in ten years time, this was a significant risk that they had no way to hedge or insure against. 20 The abbeys are unlikely to have faced any risk that the merchants would default because they had usually received much of or all of the specified money due at the time of signing the contract.
On the merchants' side, the potential risks are more numerous, but arguably less catastrophic in most cases. These risks, which are nicely summarised by Eldridge and Maltby (1993, p.44 
) include
• The risk of default due to disease in the sheep
• The risk of deliberate default by a dishonest monastery
• The risk of seizure of the wool by the crown, or of the imposition of taxes.
• The risk that a debt-ridden abbey will declare itself bankrupt to be taken into royal custody.
The contracts that have been investigated give some indication of whether default occurred. Of the 227 contracts documented only 60 state that the delivery was made in full. We cannot make any assumptions concerning the outcomes of those contracts that do not specify either that the delivery occurred in full or that there was a default. Therefore, the default rate appears to be about 5 in 41 or 12%. However, particularly in times of widespread sheep disease, the probability of default is likely to have been much higher than this. In the case of default, the records suggest that the "recovery rate" for the merchants was about half of the volume of wool specified in the contract. More often, though, the king's willingness to protect ailing monasteries coupled with the merchants' desire to maintain a grip on the sources of best quality wool led in most cases of default to a renegotiation of the original contract, 20 Apart from entering into a forward agreement of the sort we investigate and then defaulting.
frequently skewed more in the merchants' favour but giving the abbot a more practical timetable for delivery. The ultimate indirect penalty, of course, could be dissolution of the monastery, although this would not help the merchants since an amount equivalent to the value of the default would be paid to the crown from monastic assets, not to the merchants. While short-term bankruptcies did occur at Flaxley, Kirkstall and Rievaulx, for example, the general pattern tended towards renegotiation and survival rather than this most severe of consequences. 21 The impact on the merchant of the wool seller defaulting is unclear, and would depend on whether the merchant had already sold the wool on to a third party. Damages to cover default were sometimes specified in the terms of the contract. If he had not, the maximum potential loss would be the advance payment made, plus any foregone return on the sum that could have been earned between payment of advance and default. But if the merchant was also obliged to deliver the wool, and had to purchase the wool at the prevailing spot price, the loss could be more substantial. In summary, the possibility of one of the counterparties defaulting on the contract agreement will only affect the prices if either one party is more risky than the other or if one party would be affected more adversely by a default than the other.
Both parties faced risks and it is not obvious which were the greater.
One would have expected that the probability of default would be higher the longer the contract, and therefore that the merchants would have been prepared to pay less per sack for longer contracts implying a higher rate of interest on the loan component. There seems to be no evidence for this among the contracts that we studied, since the correlation between the length of the contract and the discount of the price paid per sack relative to the prevailing market price was -0.18. Thus slightly higher prices per sack were paid on average for longer contracts, perhaps suggesting that the merchants valued a continuing supply of wool more highly than they did the additional risk. There is also evidence that merchants were sometimes willing to pay inflated prices in a deliberate attempt to preclude rival merchants from obtaining wool supplies.
Were the Forward Prices Specified in the Contracts Unbiased and Were the Markets Efficient?
A further issue worthy of investigation i s the extent to which the forward rate unbiasedness (FRU) hypothesis held in the medieval wool market. This hypothesis states that (in the absence of transactions costs and other impediments to the effective functioning of the markets), the forward price should be an unbiased predictor of the subsequent spot price. Such analyses have been conducted extensively in the context of exchange rates (see, for example Hansen and Hodrick, 1980 or Goodhart et al., 1992) . Clearly, however, the wool market is unlikely to have been frictionless and available data are limited, but it is 21 For Flaxley and Rievaulx see Lloyd (1977, p. 290) and for Kirkstall see Barnes (1984, pp. 43-4). nonetheless of interest to investigate whether this relation holds using a regression model of the following type 22
where k t S + is the spot price prevailing at time t+k, k t F , is the forward price for k periods ahead available at time t, and so on, and ut is an error term 23 . Some researchers may suggest that significance of the parameters b1 or c1 in equation (3) is not indicative of inefficiency since these do not imply an unexploited arbitrage opportunity, but we would argue that if the market is functioning properly, there should be no information from stale spot prices or previous discounts that could be used to predict the next period discount.
A natural joint hypothesis to test is H0: a = 0 and b1 = 0 and c1 = 0. This hypothesis represents the restriction that the deviation of the forward rate from the realised rate at time t+1 should have a mean value insignificantly different from zero ( a = 0) and it should be independent of any information available at time t (b1 = 0 and c1 = 0). This hypothesis represents a joint test of FRU and of the efficiency of the spot and forward markets, although simpler test of FRU alone would simply focus on a, with both of the other parameters set to zero. We employ a pooled sample of data from 67 different contracts, some with only one batch for forward delivery and others with up to 20, totalling 277 observations on the forward prices from the contracts and spot prices relating to those delivery dates.
It should already be evident from the analysis above that in modern financial parlance, the forward price will be a downwardly biased predictor of the future spot price, and therefore a would be expected to be significantly positive and thus there will be normal backwardation 24 . However, it is still of interest to consider whether the markets were efficient, although it is only possible to conduct such an examination using the lagged spot prices, and not on the lagged difference between the spot and forward prices, the "discount" to avoid confusion with the basis 25 . 22 The variables in this equation are often employed in their logarithmic forms, but for ease of interpretation, we use the levels here. 23 Sometimes the test regression is instead conducted with the dependent variable being the change in the spot price from time t to time t+k. 24 However, this arises from the loan component of the transaction rather than as compensation for speculators as may be the case for modern commodity forwards. 25 The basis is the difference between the current spot price and the forward price for delivery in the future, that is,
We first run a regression of
on a constant only to determine the average value of this dependent variable, and we obtain â = 416.78, with a standard error of 49.36 ( p-value 0.000). Thus, ignoring all other influences, the typical price per sack received by the sheep breeders is 417d lower than they would have received on the open market.
Next, we reduce the sample to consider only the first year of any contract (thus setting k = 1 in equation 2). We do this firstly because the forward prices per sack in the agreements are almost always identical for the life of the contract, and secondly, because we want to ensure that when we test for efficiency, we are only employing current and lagged prices that would have been in the information sets of those forming the agreements. This reduces the number of available observations to 63. We thus run a regression of the form
where St+1,i denotes the spot price for contract i prevailing at time t+1, and Ft,1,i is the forward price for contract i and for delivery 1 period (year) ahead, made at time t. We also want to examine formally the relationship between the basis and the length of the contract and between the basis and the size of the contract (the total number of sacks to be delivered). This leads to the regression
Finally, we are also interested in determining the impact of the monastic order on the discount.
Unfortunately, we have insufficient number of contracts for the individual orders to be able to examine this within a regression framework, so we instead consider the impact of belonging to any religious order. We achieve this by repeating regression (5) but only for contracts where the seller was a member of a religious order. This further reduces the number of observations to 37.
An alternative approach to determining whether the spot and forward markets were informationally would be to examine whether there existed any lead-lag relationships between the spot and forward prices, although this is not possible for our dataset since we do not have an evenly spaced time-series of forward prices. Table 3 gives summary information and calculated interest rates for the contracts that we examined. All prices quoted in the table are in old pence. It is not immediately obvious whether the spot prices used in the interest rate calculations should relate to those prevailing at the times when the wool was to be delivered, or whether they should be the prices quoted at the time that the contract was initially signed. A present value relationship would usually use the former, while the latter also makes sense in this case in order to use only the information that would have been available to the counterparties at the time when they were establishing the contract details. We employ (separately) both methods for determining the spot prices, and this almost always makes little difference to the calculated interest rates.
Results
Results of Interest Rate Calculations
The fourth and sixth columns of Table 3 show the total number of sacks to be delivered over the life of the contract, and the number of sacks per year respectively, while the fifth column gives the delivery dates for each batch of wool. The third column from the right of the table shows the forward prices per sack as specified in the contracts, and the last two columns give the interest rates for each spot price measure, calculated by solving the present value relationships of the form given in equation (2) to find r for each contract.
Of course, there will be situations where our spot prices are somewhat inaccurate (for example, if Lloyd's prices are based on a very small sample for a particular region in a particular year), or where the spot prices changed substantially between when the contract was enrolled and when the wool was due for delivery. There may also be case-specific details of which we are unaware (for example, a monastery being unable to secure a good price for its wool owing to previous defaults). These factors may result in negative calculated interest rates, which we set to zero in the table, or implausibly high rates of interest.
Examining the last two columns of Table 3 , there are evidently some zero rates and some implausibly high rates. But for the majority of contracts that we investigated, and that were amenable to this analysis, the implied rates of interest are not only plausible, but are also in accordance with other historical studies detailing interest rates on alternative types of transactions at that time. For example, Eldridge and Maltby cite Mate (1973) , who studied loans to Canterbury cathedral priory, where interest rates ranged from 15%-24% per annum, and Gilchrist (1969, p.298) , who suggested that loans to the church commanded interest rates of 15%-38%. Employing the spot prices that prevailed when the contract was signed for the whole lifetime of the contract gives a median interest rate per annum of 22%; using the spot prices that prevailed at each delivery date gives a median rate of 18% per annum; the majority of implied interest rates are between 10% and 40%.
Eldridge and Maltby's study used data from a contract made between the Fountains Abbey in Yorkshire and a consortium of Florentine merchants, enrolled on 15 October 1276 (the second contract on our list in Table 3 ). They calculated interest rates of between 40% and 60% per annum, depending on assumptions made concerning the spot rate. However, they used a different approach to determining the spot prices (that we would argue is less accurate than the method employed here). They assumed that the time until delivery of the first batch of wool was a year when in fact it was nine months, and they did not allow for the fact that collecta wool was to be delivered under the contract rather than the monastery's own wool, whereas we account for this. Our calculated interest rates for this contract are 17% and 22% (depending on the dates used to determine the spot prices), figures much closer to those usually quoted for financial transactions during the thirteenth century. Table 4 presents the results of the test regressions for market efficiency. Comparing the sizes of the intercept parameters across the regressions for all sellers and for monastic sellers only, it is again evident that the latter obtained a worse deal, with heavier discounts relative to the high price that their good wool could have obtained if sold in the year it was sheared. The sizes and statistical significances of the intercepts in all four regressions are clear evidence that the contract forward prices were biased, but were the markets efficient? That is, was there information that would have been available to the counterparties at the time the contract was signed that was not incorporated into the deal? Although they all have the same positive sign, none of the one period lagged spot price changes are significant in the regressions, and only the two period lagged price changes are significant in the "all seller" regressions. This can be interpreted as suggesting that only to a limited degree could old information from the spot market have been used to predict the subsequent discount. It would therefore be concluded that, by comparison with studies on modern day financial markets, the Medieval wool markets were fairly efficient. In particular, there is no evidence that the discount could have been predicted using this stale information when the sellers were abbots.
Results of Wool Market Efficiency Tests
Comparing these results with existing studies on the efficiency of modern wool markets suggests that broadly the same conclusions were reached. Goss (1990) and Graham-Higgs et al. (1999) both examine the Australian wool spot-futures price relationship. Goss employs a simultaneous equations model that allows for inventory sizes and the roles of speculators and hedgers. He finds that information from the model is useful for predicting subsequent spot prices, but urges caution in interpreting this as evidence for market inefficiency. Graham-Higgs et al. use an error correction model, finding that wool spot and futures prices are cointegrated, but that the speed of adjustment following deviations from equilibrium is slow, particularly for longer dated futures. Thus, even for these modern contracts that are highly liquid and tradable on a formal exchange, the evidence for efficiency is mixed. When considered in this light, the medieval wool forward market was remarkably well-functioning and orderly.
Finally, there seems to be virtually no relationship between the contract size (total number of sacks to be delivered) and the discount, nor between the length of the contract period and the discount. Sellers of larger quantities who were to deliver quickly (i.e. short contracts) would generate the smallest forward pricing discounts relative to market prices, as one would expect. However, the small sizes of the coefficients and their lack of statistical significance mean that we should not read too much into these results.
Conclusions
Our study has documented the existence of a large number of agreements for the advance sale of wool, formed mainly between Italian merchants and monastic orders in England. We have calculated the interest rates implied in these transactions to typically be of the order 10-40%, and we have investigated the informational efficiency of the market, finding limited evidence of predictability in the discount. We also conducted an examination of the efficiency of the medieval English wool spot and forward markets, finding little evidence of inefficiencies in the sense that stale information could be used to predict future market outcomes. This paper adds to the growing body of evidence that those transacting in the medieval economy were much more financially aware than modern commentators give them credit for. For example, Kohn (1999) suggests that risk transfer instruments were already in existence at that time. Marine insurance, for instance, was available as early as 1300 in large ports such as Venice, and there is also evidence that early insurers were aware of moral hazard problems, only permitting a fraction of the value of a cargo to be insured. It seems that "modern finance" is perhaps not so modern after all, and that valuation formulae developed in the past few decades were implicitly in use over 700 years ago.
Our research suggests several potentially fruitful avenues for further study. First, it would be of interest to examine in greater detail the financial positions of the abbeys. Was there, for example, a relationship between the state of their finances and the forward price discount? It may be that knowledgeable merchants were able to exploit the monasteries in trouble that were the most desperate for cash. Second, is there a relationship between the likelihood of default and the size of the forward price discount? Clearly, monasteries that had sold their wool the most cheaply relative to prevailing prices would have the strongest incentives to renege on the deal when the wool became available. Finally, the existence of the advance contracts for the sale of wool that we have investigated appears to be a historically unique phenomenon as they are confined to a short period at the close of the thirteenth century. As well as investigating other aspects of these contracts in greater detail, such as the credit risk that the merchants faced when they made up-front payments to the monasteries, future research may investigate why the forward agreements died out almost as quickly as they arose. 
